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Abstract
On September 30th, 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed the 
first travel-associated case of US Ebola in Dallas, TX. This case exposed two of the greatest 
concerns in patient safety in the US outpatient health care system: misdiagnosis and ineffective 
use of electronic health records (EHRs). The case received widespread media attention 
highlighting failures in disaster management, infectious disease control, national security, and 
emergency department (ED) care. In addition, an error in making a correct and timely Ebola 
diagnosis on initial ED presentation brought diagnostic decision-making vulnerabilities in the 
EHR era into the public eye. In this paper, we use this defining “teachable moment” to highlight 
the public health challenge of diagnostic errors and discuss the effective use of EHRs in the 
diagnostic process. We analyze the case to discuss several missed opportunities and outline key 
challenges and opportunities facing diagnostic decision-making in EHR-enabled health care. It is 
important to recognize the reality that EHRs suffer from major usability and inter-operability 
issues, but also to acknowledge that they are only tools and not a replacement for basic history-
taking, examination skills, and critical thinking. While physicians and health care organizations 
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ultimately need to own the responsibility for addressing diagnostic errors, several national-level 
initiatives can help, including working with software developers to improve EHR usability. 
Multifaceted approaches that account for both technical and non-technical factors will be needed. 
Ebola US Patient Zero reminds us that in certain cases, a single misdiagnosis can have widespread 
and costly implications for public health.
Keywords
cognition; decision-making; diagnostic error; Ebola; electronic medical records; health 
information technology; human factors; misdiagnosis; patient safety
Introduction
On September 30th, 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed 
the first travel-associated case of US Ebola in Dallas, TX, which eventually led to the death 
of the patient on October 8th. On October 15th, in his testimony to the US Congress, the 
Chief Clinical Officer of Texas Health Resources said “Unfortunately, in our initial 
treatment of [Patient Zero]… we made mistakes. We did not correctly diagnose his 
symptoms as those of Ebola. We are deeply sorry” [1]. The mishandling of US Patient Zero 
is receiving widespread media attention highlighting failures in disaster management, 
infectious disease control, national security, and emergency department (ED) care. In 
addition, an error in making a correct and timely Ebola diagnosis on initial ED presentation 
also brought decision-making vulnerabilities in the era of the Electronic Health Record 
(EHR) into the public eye. The misdiagnosis and subsequent treatment of US Patient Zero 
has generated fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the competence of our health care delivery 
system. While there are many lessons to be learned, we use this defining “teachable 
moment” to highlight the public health challenge of diagnostic errors and the effective use 
of EHRs in the diagnostic process. Analysis of this case reveals several missed opportunities 
and key issues that warrant attention from the medical and policy communities.
Case history
Although discrepancies exist in information about the chain of events that transpired when 
Patient Zero presented to the ED, we have used the hospital’s testimony and additional 
publically available information, including preliminary findings released to the public from 
the 1400 pages of medical records made available to the Associated Press (AP) by the 
patient’s family, to reconstruct the chain of events [2]. According to the Texas Health 
Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas, TX, on September 25th, US Patient Zero (Mr. Thomas Eric 
Duncan) presented with a temperature of 100.1F, dizziness, nausea, abdominal pain, a sharp 
headache, and decreased urination [3]. Both the testimony and AP records reveal that 3.5 h 
into the patient’s visit to the ED his temperature spiked to 103 degrees, which later dropped 
to 101.2 degrees [4]. The patient rated his “severe pain” at eight on a scale of one to ten, 
which contradicts the initial hospital statement that the patient’s symptoms “were not severe 
at the time he first visited the hospital emergency department.” His travel history from 
Liberia, a country highlighted in recent news, was recorded in the nurse’s notes. Based on 
the publically available information and the testimony, it is clear that this information was 
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not appreciated or acted upon. He was prescribed antibiotics, told to take Tylenol, and 
discharged after 4 h in the ED. The AP records also indicate the diagnosis given to US 
Patient Zero before his discharge “included sinusitis” but that CT scans of “head and 
abdomen” ordered during the ED visit showed no evidence of sinusitis or other conditions 
such as stroke or appendicitis [5]. Two days later, the patient worsened and returned to the 
same ED and was subsequently admitted to the hospital.
On October 1st, the hospital announced that the initial ED nurse failed to communicate the 
travel history to physicians. The next day they blamed a technical flaw in the EHR – the 
misalignment of the physicians’ and nurses’ workflows – which prevented physicians from 
seeing the travel history in the nurse’s notes. Within 24 h they reversed their position and 
announced that the travel history was indeed documented and available to the full care team 
in the EHR within the physician’s workflow, and there was no flaw in the EHR [3].
The initial ED progress notes were not available for us to review. However, based on our 
experience in analyzing these issues, we hypothesize the following explanations about the 
EHR-related documentation at the first visit to explain some of the discrepancies. According 
to AP, the ED physician’s note said Mr. Duncan was “negative for fever and chills”; 
however, this could have been selected erroneously from a series of pre-defined symptom 
options in the EHR system. Further on, the note reads: “I have given patient instructions 
regarding their diagnosis, expectations for the next couple of days, and specific return 
precautions. The condition of the patient at this time is stable.” Because of the generic nature 
of this phrase and the use of a gender-neutral plural pronoun when referring to a patient, we 
believe this phrase was likely selected from a set of pre-defined patient instructions and may 
not have accurately reflected the physician’s true intent.
The complexity of diagnostic errors and the role of the EHR
Contradictory statements from the hospital and the lack of full transparency have 
complicated the factual analysis of this case, a critical and urgent public health emergency. 
Nevertheless, the misdiagnosis of US Patient Zero is a perfect prototype for one of the 
biggest vulnerabilities of outpatient medicine. The incidence of diagnostic error is thought to 
be in the range of 10%– 15% [6]; in the US alone, approximately 12 million adults are 
estimated to be misdiagnosed annually in outpatient settings [7]. Diagnostic errors are not 
new and are seen in both rare conditions, and common ones, such as cancers, cardiovascular 
conditions, and other infections. Both systems and cognitive factors are usually at play in 
these cases [8], and many breakdowns involve missing obvious clues when obtaining the 
patient’s history and performing the physical exam [9–11]. Perhaps the biggest red flag in 
this case was the patient himself, a black man with a foreign accent who reported he came 
from Liberia and presented with serious “flu-like” symptoms to an ED which reportedly had 
received CDC and county health department’s guidance as early as July 28th, 2014 [1]. We 
do not know whether the significance of this red flag was fully comprehended by either the 
registration clerk who would have checked the patient’s identification or the nurse who 
documented his travel. It is also unknown if the large presence of immigrants in the area led 
to complacency on the part of providers to overlook travel history. The Dallas County 
Commissioner referred to the hospital as being located “next to a little Ellis Island” hinting 
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at the large immigrant population in the area. What is clear is that the importance of the 
geographic link to Liberia/West Africa was not appreciated by the treating physician. 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), most confirmed, probable, or 
suspected Ebola deaths have occurred in three West African countries: Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Guinea. Thus, the available evidence suggests that the physician did not obtain 
or appreciate the travel history during the patient encounter and did not consider the 
possibility of Ebola infection.
Assigning blame to the EHR is not new and often reflects a reluctance to address the 
complex cognitive and/or performance issues involving front-line staff, especially those 
related to responsibility and accountability. It is important that we recognize the reality that 
EHRs suffer from major usability and inter-operability issues [12–14], but also to 
acknowledge that they are only tools and not a replacement for basic history-taking, 
examination skills, and critical thinking [15]. Let us not forget that the diagnosis of Ebola in 
West Africa is not aided by EHRs. Basic clinical skills will be more important than ever 
because research reveals that clinicians often miss relatively common conditions [10].
Several other ‘human factor’ issues may have contributed to the diagnostic error in this case. 
A host of system-related factors detract from optimal conditions for critical thinking in the 
ED, leading clinicians to lose situational awareness [16]. These include production 
pressures, distractions, and inefficient processes. Also, physicians tend to ignore nursing 
notes, whether on paper or in the EHR. Many organizations modify their EHR-related 
workflows to ensure that specific data elements required for quality measures (none of 
which focus on diagnostic quality) are reliably captured. In the Ebola case, the nurse was 
using a template “designed to provide a high reliability nursing process to allow for the 
administration of influenza vaccine under a physician-delegated standing order” to record 
history [3]. These highly-constrained tools are optimized for data capture but at the expense 
of sacrificing their utility for appropriate triage and diagnosis, leading users to miss the 
forest for the trees.
The implications of the misdiagnosis were profound. Emerging details reveal that even after 
the second ED visit which led to hospitalization, strict Ebola isolation precautions were not 
followed for 2 days, until the diagnosis was confirmed by the CDC. While there was clinical 
suspicion of a life-threatening diagnosis on this admission, it is uncertain if this was 
overshadowed due to possible over-reliance on diagnostic testing to confirm the diagnosis.
Policy and practice reform to address diagnostic error in the EHR-era
Physicians and health care organizations ultimately need to own the responsibility for 
addressing diagnostic errors, but several national-level initiatives can help, including 
working with software developers to improve EHR usability. Despite their emerging 
significance, diagnostic errors are largely ignored by policy-makers, industry, and health 
care institutions in part due to their complexity and measurement challenges [17–19]. Within 
the many initiatives attempting to improve patient safety and value-based purchasing being 
promoted by Congress, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), large health 
care purchasers, and health plans, virtually none relate to accuracy and timeliness of 
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diagnosis [20]. Outpatient reimbursement policies do not reward diagnostic decision-
making, teamwork, or quality time spent with the patient in making a diagnosis.
Many of these policy and practice issues are especially relevant for primary care and 
emergency rooms, which are often considered “laboratories” for diagnostic errors. Rigorous 
teamwork-related practices are needed to help transform these busy outpatient settings 
where communication and coordination breakdowns are prevalent [21]. High-risk clinical 
processes need to become much more reliable so that vital opportunities and clues are not 
missed. As this case illustrates, EHR-based clinical workflows often fail to optimize 
information sharing amongst various team members, leading to lapses in recognizing 
specific clinical findings that could aid in rapid and accurate diagnosis. In addition, 
physicians need timely feedback on diagnostic accuracy if they are to learn from their 
actions, but such systems do not exist [22] nor are there any incentives to build them. 
Clinical practice must have systems of feedback loops about patient outcomes so we can 
learn from mistakes [23, 24]. Widespread use of EHRs and better data availability should 
facilitate the development of these systems [25].
Multifaceted approaches that account for both technical and non-technical factors will be 
needed to prevent misdiagnosis in the EHR-era [26]. Current EHRs lack the innovations 
needed to prevent misdiagnosis. Condition-specific charting templates, drop-down selection 
lists, and checkboxes developed in response to billing or quality reporting requirements 
potentially distort history-taking, examination, and their accurate and comprehensive 
recording. We suspect this might have occurred in this case. Clinicians also tend to ignore 
template-generated notes in their review process; often the signal-to-noise ratio in these 
notes is low. EHRs can lead to less verbal exchange [27], which is all the more needed and 
more effective when dealing with complex tasks and communicating critical information 
[28]. Ideally, the nurse should have verbally communicated the red flag to the physician 
instead of relying on the physician to find this information in the EHR. Other factors, such 
as heavy data entry requirements and frequent copy-and-paste from previous notes, detract 
from critical thinking during the diagnostic decision-making process [29]. Improving 
diagnosis and reducing diagnostic errors in the EHR-era should thus be a major research 
priority. For EHRs to be most effective, they need to be able to automatically sort through 
patient data, identify the pertinent findings, and present them in an easy to understand 
manner. Computer algorithms could combine patient-specific information with the latest 
evidence-based clinical knowledge to help clinicians reach the correct diagnosis.
This first case of Ebola in the US has exposed two of the greatest concerns in patient safety 
in the US outpatient health care system: misdiagnosis and ineffective use of EHRs. This 
only increases the significance and responsibility of the consensus study on diagnostic errors 
commissioned by the Institute of Medicine, and expected to be released in Fall 2015. 
Diagnostic errors typically have affected only one patient at a time [10], but Patient Zero 
reminds us that in certain cases, a single misdiagnosis can have widespread and costly 
implications for public health.
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